$7.0 Buy It Now or Best Offer
free,30-Day Returns
Seller Store
() %,
Location: New Kensington, Pennsylvania, United States
Ships to: US,
Item: 163002567265
eBay History of the Organization of t OD Green 1″ X 3 1/2″ Expert Infantry Tab — Merrowed Edge and Velcro Backing — OIF, OEF, Desert Storm, Operation Just Cause, Somalia, 11B, Grunt, Fort Benning. History of the Organization of the Infantry The Era of Revolution When Congress, on 14 June 1775, moved to take over the New England Army then besieging Boston as a Continental establishment, it also authorized ten companies of riflemen to be raised in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia as part of the new Continental Army. The next day, Congress appointed George Washington its Commander in Chief. Before leaving their home state, the six rifle companies from Pennsylvania were combined to form William Thompson’s Rifle Battalion. This battalion and the other new rifle units organized rapidly and marched quickly to Boston. The New England Army around Boston was composed of citizen soldiers. From the earliest times that type of soldier (male members of the community aged 18-45) had been required to associate in military organizations called «militia,» and to train to defend his own locality. The militia system amounted to universal military training for men of active ages, but it was for local defense almost entirely. What is more, its enforcement rested altogether with the colonies. At the outbreak of the Revolution, all the colonies had military organizations operating, but their effectiveness was, in many cases, slight. It was the general ineffectiveness of the militia system, coupled with the need for centralized control, that brought about the creation of the Continental Army. Even so, on account of the militia, the colonies were able to utilize the experience of many veterans of England’s colonial wars, familiar with the British Army and with the Indian modes of fighting it. These veterans were a very valuable asset. In addition to the rifle units and the besieging army, Congress later authorized the raising and maintaining of Continental infantry battalions in the southern states. By December 1775 there were forty-nine infantry battalions (or regiments, for the two terms were virtually synonymous) and several unattached companies in the establishment. The Continental Congress took the bulk of the army besieging Boston in 1775 as it found it. Since most of the units were enlisted only for the calendar year, General Washington had either to attempt to re-enlist the soldiers already in service or to assemble a new army. During the fall of 1775, he strove to retain the Continental troops for the duration .of the war, but was only successful in keeping part of them, and those for just one more year. A canvass of the officers of thirtynine regiments in November showed that 751 officers were willing to continue their service for one year while 406 were not. The legislators set the size of the army around Boston at 20,372 officers and men, to be organized into twenty-seven regiments and some separate companies. In this scheme New England, which had supplied forty-two in 1775, provided twenty-six Continental regiments in 1776. These twenty-six were numbered from the 2d through the 27th. They were designated Continental infantry in an attempt to transfer the men’s loyalty from the states to the Congress. The 1st Continental did not come from New England, but was built around the nine companies of riflemen then in William Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion. Six of those companies were among the original units of the Continental Army, while the other three joined up later. All lost their specialization as rifle companies and the «regiment» became a standard element of the line. Diverse units entered the Continental service, until by December 1776 there were eighty-two battalions of foot soldiers in all. During the year 1776 the following new units of battalion size were added to the establishment: John Haslet’s Delaware Regiment James Livingston’s Regiment, known as the 1st Canadian. Moses Hazen’s Regiment; known as the 2d Canadian, also as Congress’ Own. (The two Canadian regiments contained about equal numbers of Canadians and New Englanders, but in January 1781 all foreigners in the service were transferred to Hazen’s.) Seth Warner’s Regiment, officered by men who had participated in the invasion of Canada in 1775 and filled in part by Green Mountain Boys. Samuel Miles’ Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment 2d-12th Pennsylvania 1st-3d Georgia 1st-3d New Jersey 1st-9th Virginia William Smallwood’s Maryland Regiment Charles Burrall’s Connecticut Regiment Samuel Elmore’s Connecticut Regiment Andrew Ward’s Connecticut Regiment The German Battalion Their officers were appointed by Congress upon the recommendation of the Commander in Chief. Late in 1776 it was once again necessary to cope with the dissolution of the army, but this time Congress took a new tack. It attempted to create a force to serve «during the present war.» The legislators, observing the size of the army in being, set the new establishment at eighty-eight battalions, and apportioned these among all the states, so that Massachusetts had to provide the greatest number, fifteen, and Delaware and Georgia the smallest, one apiece. The eighty-eight battalions thus authorized were raised, equipped, and officered by the states. They were no longer known by Continental numbers, but carried instead numbers in the several state organizations. These state organizations were called «lines,» the term used then for the regular infantry or «foot» that made up the line of battle of an army. The state lines together comprised the Continental Line. These should not be confused with the occasional state regiments which were raised on a permanent basis for local service only. Although the regiments of the several states, arranged in the Continental Line, replaced the numbered regiments of 1776 (for example, the 9th Continental of 1776 became the 1st Regiment of the Rhode Island Line in 1777) , the change was mostly one of name. The relationship of regiments to states remained about as it had been, and the appointment of officers continued to be in practice a collaboration between Congress, the Commander in Chief, and the states. Some of the Continental regiments became units in the state lines, while the men and officers of others transferred to the new regiments of 1777 without carrying the lineages of their 1776 outfits with them. The reorganization of the winter of 1776 did not radically alter the way men came into the Continental service or the manner in which regiments were organized, but it did place responsibility for procurement, replacement, and supply more squarely upon the states. This stimulated an increased effort in some states: for example, Massachusetts and Connecticut (although later overruled by Congress) voted to supplement the Continental pay of their lines. In December 1776, while the reorganization of the American. Army was taking place, the British advanced into New. Jersey. Faced with this threat, Congress authorized Washington to add sixteen purely Continental battalions .to the foot establishment. This action resulted in part from the fact that the states had been unutterably slow in supplying their quotas for the eighty-eight line battalions. The term of service of the new sixteen was the same as that of the state lines, for three years or for the duration, but the similarity ended there. Washington raised them wherever he could, and appointed all their officers himself. The new Continental regiments were usually recruited within one state and, like all other units, had a hard struggle to reach full strength. The organization established late in 1776 and early in 1777-containing as it did the state lines coupled with the sixteen additional Continental battalions-was a compromise between two needs. The first need was to utilize the powerful authority of the states, without which the conflict could not be prosecuted; the second was to have at least some regiments subject only to the will of the Commander in Chief. All regiments sent out their own recruiting parties to prescribed areas, but to keep the fighting army up to strength was almost an impossible job. In consequence, during 1780, when the theater of war had moved south, Washington had not enough troops to act against the enemy with the part of the army that he commanded in person. Indeed, Congress found it necessary to consolidate the sixteen additional Continentals with the state lines, and, at the same time, to fuse the separate corps and the German Battalion into them too. More important, the infantry of the entire Continental establishment was reduced to fifty battalions by 1 January 1781. Such a reduction of the infantry was not dictated by strategy. On the contrary, it was the result of a grave failure, the failure to be able to maintain a larger number of regiments. As in previous years, new units appeared in the roster of the Continental Army during the four years beginning with 1777. They were often the result of the reorganization of earlier outfits. From various sources came the following units: 1st-15th Massachusetts 5th New York 1st-6th Maryland 4th New Jersey 7th-10th North Carolina 10th-15th Virginia The Corps of Invalids These regiments and those in the preceding list made up the spine of the Army after 1776. They were not static; indeed some of the early ones provided elements of the others. Moreover, they supplied companies to special corps such as the legions of Henry Lee and Casimir Pulaski and the Corps of Light Infantry. An understanding of the internal organization of the Continental infantry regiments and their components requires a short explanation of infantry tactics in the eighteenth century. To begin with, the heart of a battle as fought in western Europe was the line of infantry. It was this line which had to be broken if victory were to be won; hence the heavy fire of the artillery and the maneuvers of the cavalry were chiefly directed against it. It was common in Europe for the battle line to be formed on an open plain just outside of effective artillery range of the enemy. This meant that the two lines took their positions within 500 yards of each other, a distance at which, with modern firearms, few men would be left standing. This is the fact which makes it hardest for moderns to visualize early warfare. The effective range of the musket of the period was not over 100 yards and was often nearer 50. Fighting at such ranges, infantry organization was founded upon the need to form the line, control it in battle, renew it when decimated, and maneuver it so as to place the enemy at a disadvantage. But this was not the beginning and the end of infantry tactics, particularly in the rough, wooded terrain of North America. In the colonial wars of the eighteenth century, the need had grown for infantrymen to precede the battle line. Their purpose was to screen the advance or retreat of their own main body, to break up the power of the volley from the enemy’s line, and otherwise to soften that line for an assault with bayonets. Such an assault commonly began at a distance of fifty yards or less from the foe. As a result, one of two things took place: either a savage hand-to-hand encounter, or a collapse and retreat by one of the lines, In any case, the infantrymen who moved out ahead of the line were trained to aim at individuals, to protect themselves by using cover, and to operate with an interval of several yards between them. They came to be called «light infantry.» In contrast to their action, the line fired by volley without taking individual aim, remained standing unless ordered to do otherwise, and advanced with the men in it actually elbow to elbow up to the moment of the assault. In the American service, as in the British, battalions and regiments were usually one and the same. An English regiment had ten companies in it, eight of them (the «battalion companies») for the line, the other two for special uses. These were the elite or «flank companies.» One called the «grenadier company» was composed of men picked for their strength acrd courage. As often as not (for instance, at Bunker Hill) the grenadier companies were detached from their regiments and used together in provisional grenadier battalions. These were given the most difficult assignments, and the posts of honor (that is, of greatest danger) if used in the battle line. The tenth company in a British battalion was called the «light company.» Light companies were also detached and consolidated into provisional battalions, but as often they were assigned a truly light mission, that is, to advance ahead of the line, screen it, and demoralize the enemy. This mission of light infantry in the American service was usually performed by rifle units, which fanned out in front of the army and, with their accurate fire, galled the enemy severely. At first there was no counterpart to flank companies in the Continental infantry. Beginning in August 1777, however, General Washington directed that 108 men and 9 officers be drawn from each brigade and formed into a temporary Corps of Light Infantry. When winter came this corps was disbanded, but. it had proved so useful that Washington urged Congress to authorize one light company for each battalion to be formed into a separate corps during every campaign thereafter. It was with the Light Corps, which resulted, that Anthony Wayne stormed Stony Point on 16 July 1779 in the most celebrated night attack made by Americans during the Revolution. Like the British Grenadiers, the American Corps of Light Infantry became the elite body of the Army. Command was eagerly sought in it by the most enterprising officers and places in the ranks by the men. Although the Corps as a whole continued to be disbanded each winter and raised afresh for every campaign, one light company became permanent in each Continental battalion after mid-1780. Prior to that time American battalions had contained only eight companies, those of the line, so that the addition brought the total up to nine, still one short of the British. The Corps of Light Infantry received special training in the use of the bayonet. During July 1780 it was put under the command of Lafayette, and made the chief American assaults the following year upon the enemy’s works at Yorktown. One of the distinctive features about the Revolutionary War was the use of rifles and rifle units in it. The rifle was virtually unknown in the New England Army that opened the war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, muskets were the armament of the troops of the line. At 100 yards, the best musketeers could hit a man-sized target only four shots out of every ten. In contrast, expert riflemen could kill a man with every shot at 100 yards and do good execution at twice that range. The chief limitations on the use of riflemen were the scarcity of expert shots and the fact that the rifle could not carry a bayonet. Although the latter deficiency was somewhat overcome through the use of tomahawks and knives, riflemen remained vulnerable to a determined bayonet attack. Accordingly, riflemen were not useful in the line, but both sides made extensive use of them as sharpshooters ahead of and around the main fighting force. As already mentioned, the rifle companies from Pennsylvania in William Thompson’s Battalion soon lost their specialization and became an element of the line, armed with muskets. Nearly as short-lived as a rifle unit was the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment, composed of the original Continental rifle companies from Maryland and Virginia plus some later ones from the same states. This unit was captured at Fort Washington on 16 November 1776 and was never re-formed. Just at the time of its capture, Daniel Morgan received a commission as Colonel of the 11th Virginia. He recruited 118 riflemen and joined the Continental Army with them at Morristown, New Jersey, early in April 1777. Very soon Washington drew 500 picked riflemen from the regiments of his Army and put them under Morgan’s command. Thus began the most famous of the rifle corps which persisted intermittently throughout the Revolution. Sometimes Washington referred to Morgan’s unit as a rifle corps, sometimes as «rangers.» The latter term requires a little elaboration. Rangers were a species of infantry that the British had developed to cope with the methods of the French and Indians in North America. They were scouts who ranged the forests spying upon the enemy, gathering intelligence on his strength and intentions, and harassing him when they could. Units of rangers had to be made up of men who understood woodcraft and who could match the Indians in stealth. Also, they had to be trained shots. Actually, corps like Daniel Morgan’s were rangers a good deal of the time. In addition, there were certain units, such as Thomas Knowlton’s Connecticut Rangers, which regularly bore the title. From time to time the size of Continental units was fixed by resolve of the Congress. Thus during the reorganization which took place at the end of 1775, regiments were authorized to contain 728 officers and men, companies 78 enlisted men. These strengths were much larger than the British counterparts which were 477 and 38, respectively. Although Continental units always exceeded equivalent British units in strength, they varied widely from authorized size. For example, nine months after the first directive appeared, some companies had 67 men in them, others 88. This was, of course, the result of the unequal fall of casualties upon different outfits and the variation in the effectiveness of the recruiting systems of the several states. The Delaware Regiment illustrates a typical case of shrinkage. It was so decimated after the battle of Camden in 1780 that it had to be combined with Maryland companies to form a regiment. Later still, with the Maryland remnants, it was reorganized as a light company, commanded by Robert Kirkwood. In closing this section on the organization of Continental infantry during the Revolutionary War, nothing should be stressed more heavily than the confusion which chronically prevailed in it. At all times Washington and his staff were obliged to improvise new organizations from the remnants. of those that had been cut up in battle or had served out their short terms and gone home. Moreover, at all times it was also necessary to assimilate thousands of citizen soldiers for brief periods into some sort of working team with the Continentals. This had to be repeated over and over again with new increments because militia terms of service were very short. The attempt to utilize the militia, and put it into good enough order to be effective for at least one campaign, was perhaps the hardest of the Commander in Chief’s almost insupportable duties. In spite of its burdensomeness the effort was well placed. Indeed, John W. Fortescue, historian of the British Army, declared that the militia was the decisive factor. Be that as it may, the militia formed around the Continental Army as a nucleus, and would not have turned out had that often ragtag force not been in the field. Most of the estimated 164,000 militiamen who took up arms for terms from a day up to three months were infantry. In addition to them were other infantrymen, raised and maintained on a relatively permanent basis by the several states, who, with the militia, rallied on the Continentals and abetted the cause. When the British surrendered at Yorktown on 19 October 1781, there were sixty battalions of infantry in the Continental establishment. Afterwards, as time passed and it appeared that the British intended no new attack, that number was steadily reduced. Finally, in November 1783, after a peace had been formally ratified, only one foot regiment remained, commanded by Henry Jackson. Then, on 2 June 1784, the end came even for that unit, leaving as the only authorized vestige of the Continental Army still in service fewer than a hundred men to guard military stores at West Point and at Fort Pitt. Through the Second War With England Congress nevertheless realized the need for at least enough infantry to replace Jackson’s regiment. Accordingly, the day after the latter was directed to be discharged, the legislators established a regiment which was to be raised and officered by obtaining volunteers from the militia of four of the states. This nonRegular unit, called the First American Regiment and commanded until 1 January 1792 by Josiah Harmar of Pennsylvania, gradually turned into a Regular outfit. It became known as the 1st Infantry in 1791, and in 1815 was redesignated as the 3d Infantry. From 1784 to 1787 Harmar’s regiment was a hybrid, containing eight companies of infantry and two of artillery. Although England was a constant threat to the new nation after the War for Independence, the Indians presented the most immediate menace. Accordingly, the First American Regiment was stationed on the frontier. In October 1790, the Miami Indians and their allies defeated the first field army, commanded by Harmar, to be organized by the government of the United States acting under the Constitution. This defeat caused the raising of another regiment of infantry in 1791, and the numbering of the old one as the 1st and the new one as the 2d. As a result of the radical reorganization after the War of 1812, the latter became the 1st Infantry. Serious trouble with the Indians of the Northwest continued; indeed, in the very year the 2d Infantry was organized, the Miamis defeated the second force sent by the Federal government against them. The army defeated in 1791, led by Arthur St. Clair, consisted of the Regular establishment augmented by militia and a new species of foot troops known as levies. Goaded by defeats, Congress gradually increased the military establishment from 700 men in 1784 to 5,104 in 1793. As the size of the entire Army increased, so did the strength of the infantry elements. Regiments rose from 560 to 1,140 enlisted men, companies from 70 to 95. Regiment and battalion remained one and the same. Two beatings inflicted by the Northwest Indians brought about an experiment in organization which had precedents in certain European corps and in some of the Continental Army. The entire military establishment was converted in 1792 into a legion, that is, into a field army in which the three combat branches, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were combined in the same organization. The legion consisted of four sublegions. Each sub-legion contained infantry, riflemen, cavalry, and artillery; indeed it was the forerunner of the twentieth century regimental combat team. Although Congress had authorized a total of five regiments on 5 March 1792, when the Legion of the United States came into being, none but the 1st and 2d Infantry were actually organized. Hence it was necessary to go out and recruit infantry for the 3d and 4th Sub-Legions. Likewise it was necessary to recruit the rifle units for all the sub-legions. Command of the new Legion fell to Anthony Wayne, who had been a successful leader of light troops during the Revolution. Wayne did not employ the sublegions as such to any important extent; on the contrary, he combined the infantry from all of them, likewise the artillery, and so forth. However, he instituted so stern a system of discipline that he forged an army which, in 1794, finally beat the Indians of the Northwest and defied the power of England which had fostered Indian unrest. Once the threat in that quarter was reduced, the need to hold a field army together seemed to diminish. What was needed instead, statesmen believed, was an organization which could easily be split up and parcelled out to guard the frontiers and the seacoast. As long as Henry Knox remained Secretary of War, the legionary form had a stout champion, but he left office at the end of 1794. The Legion persisted for another year and a half, then went out of existence by act of Congress effective 31 October 1796. In the new establishment the infantry of the four sublegions became the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Infantry. Peace promised to prevail, so that during 1796 and 1797 the entire Army was reduced, and the size of regiments and companies as well. For scattered use, a large complement of officers and small companies filled the bill. All too soon the sense of security evaporated as war loomed with France. In consequence, the establishment swelled precipitately, and the strength of units with it. By 1799 a total of forty infantry regiments was authorized, although none but the 1st through the 4th ever attained the required strength. Only 3,400 men were raised for the 5th through the 16th, and none at all for any others. Fortunately, the war with France never took shape; by 1800 the crisis was over and the immediate need for more infantry gone. In addition, a new administration took office in 1801, an administration that almost pathologically feared a standing army. Accordingly, under Thomas Jefferson the infantry was cut back in 1802 to two regiments, the 1st and 2d. Jefferson’s administration had only a brief chance to test its convictions regarding a strong militia and a small standing army, for war clouds were gathering once more. The United States almost began the second war with England when the British warship Leopard attacked the American Chesapeake in 1807. This aggression caused Congress to add five Regular infantry regiments in 1808, the 3d through the 7th, and also to constitute the Regiment of Riflemen. The latter was a product of the Revolutionary experience and the first rifle unit since the end of the Legion in 1796. Rifle elements re-entered the service through the agency of Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson, commanding the army, and Henry Dearborn, Secretary of War, both of whom had had firsthand experience with them in the last war. Aside from the augmentation of April 1808 there was no further preparation for a fight until just six months before the second war with England. At that time, that is, in January 1812, Congress constituted ten new regiments of Regular infantry. The act of 11 January 1812 which created them was remarkable in at least two ways: first, it provided for the largest regiments and battalions authorized in the United States before the Civil War and, second, it established an organization that was at variance with the seven existing regiments. As a result, in the first six months of 1812 there were three different-sized infantry regiments, besides one of riflemen. The 1st and 2d regiments made up the infantry of the «military peace establishment,» and they had ten companies in them of seventy-six enlisted men. The 3d through the 7th regiments, authorized in 1808, were called the infantry of the «additional force,» and comprised ten companies with two more officers and two more enlisted men each than the 1st and 2d had. The 8th through the 17th in no way resembled the others, for they had eighteen companies of 110 enlisted men, arranged in two battalions. Although some of the bulky eighteen-company regiments were raised, several never acquired their second battalions. Recruiting was so difficult that they lacked the time to raise many men before Congress voted a fresh reorganization. Late in June 1812, the legislators changed the law. According to the new arrangement there were to be twenty-five regiments of infantry, exclusive of the rifle regiment, each containing ten companies of 102 men. Thus all the infantry regiments were made uniform on paper, and a standard of organization was established that persisted throughout the conflict. This standard was more often than not honored in the breach. Once constituted, all the twenty-five regiments organized and recruited actively, but during the first two years of the struggle their efforts brought in less than half of the total number of infantrymen authorized. Regulars at first could only enlist for five years, but late in 1812 newcomers were given a chance to enroll «during the war.» All the while the states competed with the Federal government for soldiers, and the shorter «hitches» they offered drew men into their service. To combat this Congress directed the creation, in January 1813, of twenty new infantry regiments enlisted for just one year. Nineteen of them were raised and designated as the 26th through the 44th Infantry. Later, they were converted into long-term outfits (five years or the duration) , but all the units constituted after 1811 had men in them enlisted for different terms. For example, there were in a single regiment one-year regulars, eighteenmonth men, three- and five-year men, and some in for «during the war.» Early in 1814 four more infantry regiments and three more regiments of riflemen were constituted. Finally, therefore, forty-eight infantry regiments, numbered from the 1st to the 48th, came into being, plus four rifle regiments, the 1st through the 4th. This was the greatest number of infantry units included in the Regular Army until the world wars of the twentieth century. A mighty effort was made in 1814 to raise the Army to strength, and nearly 27,000 men came in, but in spite of this, four of the regiments had to be consolidated because they were too small. The 17th, 19th, 26th, and 27th were joined to form a new 17th and a new 19th, while the two highest numbered, the 47th and 48th, were redesignated the 27th and 26th, respectively. No sooner was war over than Congress scrambled to rid itself of its more than 30,000 infantrymen. An act of 3 March 1815 set the peace establishment at 10,000 men, divided among infantry, rifle; and artillery regiments. Cavalry was eliminated, and eight infantry regiments and one rifle regiment arose from the ruins of the forty-six and four in existence. The rifles were consolidated and the infantry, after many rearrangements, settled as follows: 1st Infantry formed by consolidation of the 2d, 3d, 7th, and 44th 2d Infantry formed by consolidation of the 6th, 16th, 22d, 23d, and 32d 3d Infantry formed by consolidation of the 1st, 5th, 17th, 19th, and 28th 4th Infantry formed by consolidation of the 14th, 18th, 20th, 36th, and 38th 5th Infantry formed by consolidation of the 4th, 9th, 13th, 21st, 40th, and 46th 6th Infantry formed by consolidation of the 11th, 25th, 27th, 29th, and 37th 7th Infantry formed by consolidation of the 8th, 24th, and 39th 8th Infantry formed by consolidation of the 10th and 12th The eight remaining infantry regiments were smaller than their war predecessors because, although the number of companies in each remained at ten, every company contained 78 men instead of 103. There was no effort to preserve the honors or traditional numbers of any of ,the prewar regiments. The 1st was merged with other regiments and redesignated the 3d, and the old 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th were likewise lost in the remains of disbanded regiments. The new numbers were founded on the seniority of the colonels, the senior colonel commanding the 1st, and so forth. As a consequence of the reduction, 25,000 infantrymen were separated from the service. Another consequence was that the form of the infantry establishment was set roughly for the next thirty years. Not until the Mexican War, thirty-one years later, was it substantially expanded. The Germinal Period., 1816-1860 After the reorganization of 1815, the Regular infantry fluctuated in size with the whole military establishment. Prospects of peace appeared to improve, and in 1821 Congress felt safe enough to cut expenses by disbanding the Rifle Regiment and the 8th Infantry. Having reduced the infantry establishment to seven foot regiments, which were thought adequate to meet all contingencies, the legislators next sliced the size of companies to fifty-one enlisted men, the smallest ever. This arrangement endured for fifteen years when, as usual, the Indians forced an enlargement. At all times there was trouble with the Indians on the frontier, but two affairs assumed the magnitude of war. The first in 1831 and 1832 against the tribes of the Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin area, known as the Black Hawk War, was easily won by a force composed mostly of militia. The whole affair had no permanent impact on the Regular infantry. Not so the second of the several scraps against the Seminole Indians in Florida, which began in December 1835 and lasted until 1842. Volunteers and militia bore the brunt of the Florida War at first, but Regulars gradually replaced them. As a result, after more than two years of inconclusive fighting, Congress was obliged to augment the Regular infantry (in 1838) by adding thirty-eight privates and one sergeant to each company, and by raising a new 8th Infantry, the fourth unit to go by that number. At one time or another, every one of the eight regiments of infantry served in the Florida swamps. As quickly as the war in Florida was over in 1842, although all were retained, regiments and companies were reduced to minimum size. However, by a fluke, the Regular infantry actually increased. This came about because in the spring of 1843, to save money, the 2d Dragoons were converted into a rifle regiment. They thus became the first rifle corps included in the establishment for two decades, that is, since the Rifle Regiment had been disbanded in 1821. The erstwhile horsemen, who felt degraded on foot, clung hard to their dragoon organization, but they received rifles and, as far as is known, trained as riflemen. Agitation to remount them was continuous, and within a year they became the 2d Dragoons again. When they were reconverted, rifle corps disappeared once more from the Army, except that the President received authority from Congress to convert two or more infantry regiments into rifles if he thought it expedient. He never exercised this authority. . In May 1846 a new rifle unit, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, was constituted. This regiment had initially been designated for use on the Oregon Trail but was diverted at its origin into Mexican War service. Its animals were lost on the way, so only two companies, mounted on Mexican horses, acted as cavalry. The rest, armed with Model 1941 rifles, bayonets, and flintlock pistols, fought on foot. At the start of the Mexican War, Congress tried to get along with just eight infantry regiments of Regulars, but in doing so gave the President power to expand their companies to one hundred enlisted men during the war. Ten months after hostilities commenced, it was necessary to change this policy and add nine new regiments-with the same organization as the old ones-to the Regular infantry. Eight of them, as was customary, bore numbers, the 9th through the 16th; but the other got a name. It was called the Regiment of Voltigeurs and Foot Riflemen. Half of this unit was to be mounted, the other half on foot, and each horseman was paired with a foot soldier who was to get up behind him for rapid movements. This arrangement was never executed, and the Voltigeurs became in fact a regiment of foot riflemen, armed with the same rifle (a muzzle-loader) as the Mounted Riflemen. Quite by chance, the regiment included a company of mountain howitzers and war rockets, but it was not linked with the riflemen tactically, nor were the rockets and howitzers ever used together. Although raised as Regulars, the nine new infantry regiments created during the Mexican War were disbanded when the war was over. Their dissolution left a peace establishment of eight foot regiments. This structure seemed less adequate than it would have before 1846, for «Manifest Destiny» had entered the reckoning of the legislators. The inescapable need to protect, at least partially, the vast area taken from Mexico, and to help settlers across the great plains to California and Oregon, caused Congress to add the 9th and 10th Infantry in 1855, the fourth of both numbers in United States service. The ten regiments in existence after 1855, the 1st through the 10th, made tip the foot establishment until after the actual opening of hostilities in 1861. The Regiment of Mounted Riflemen remained active after the Mexican War, but in 1861 it was redesignated as the 3d Cavalry. The new 9th and 10th Infantry organized in 1855 were the first infantry units to receive rifle muskets instead of smoothbores as their standard arm. The rifle issued to them was built to utilize a new type of ammunition, known as Minie bullets. Because these conoidal bullets expanded when fired, they could be made small enough to be rammed easily down the barrel of a rifle. When the propellant exploded, the ball expanded into the rifling which imparted to it the spin that made rifle fire superior to that of muskets. The principle implicit in the Minie bullet worked a true revolution in the use of small arms by enabling accurate rifles to replace inaccurate muskets as standard firearms for the infantry. A regiment of ten companies-with regiment and battalion one and the same-was standard throughout the period. For training and for battle purposes, the eight battalion companies were placed in line by a complex arrangement according to the seniority of their captains, which seems to have had its origin in the protocol of medieval armies. It had no functional basis, since once lined up, the companies were renumbered from right to left. For official designation, however, a new system began in 1816. Under this system the companies were known by letters, instead of by numbers or by the names of their commanders. The two flank companies received the letters A and B, and the others C through K. There was no Company J, because J was too easily confused with I in writing. At this point it is necessary to remember that there had been only one flank company per battalion during the Revolution. The addition of a second company had occurred in 1798 when war with France seemed certain. Its adoption brought the American battalion into conformity with those of England and France, the potential European foes. But whereas their flank companies received special weapons, those in the United States infantry did not. As a result, the latter had less chance to develop techniques apart from the line. They were simply composed of men picked for their strength and courage. The truth is that conditions in America did not favor the specialization of particular companies. Indian wars had to be fought by whatever troops were available; there was no time to await the arrival of elite corps, whether called grenadiers or something else. Nor did fights with Indians give much opportunity for infantry to assume the formal line of battle with light units out front. Finally, the scattering of the companies of Regular regiments made specialized training impossible. Nevertheless, the drill manuals of the United States infantry after 1825 called the two flank units grenadier and light infantry companies. The latter term had some application, the former none at all. The acceptance of European designations resulted from the dominance of French military arrangements throughout the world in the decades after the wars of Napoleon. More specifically, it came from the fact that American drill manuals were in reality translations, only slightly modified, of French regulations. It was during this epoch that Americans borrowed a verb from the French to describe the operations of light flank companies. That verb was «to skirmish.» It grew in use and importance because the extended order of light or skirmishing infantry was very slowly challenging the tighter formations of the line. In the United States the challenge had not proceeded far at the time of the Mexican War. Rather, it was the introduction of the Minie ball, and other advances in firearms, which in the fifties forced infantry all over the world toward wider use of skirmish tactics. The trend was to give all infantrymen training as skirmishers. As a result, the Tactics adopted in 1855 discarded the distinction in name among the ten companies of a battalion. All ten took their places in line, and all were prepared, when called on, to move ahead of the line and skirmish with the foe. In the Mexican War, light battalions of Regulars were often formed for specific missions by temporarily detaching companies-not necessarily the flank ones-from different regiments. Composite battalions of this sort usually did not do as well in battle as established ones, in which men and officers understood each other and regimental pride was an active stimulant. There was, however, more distinction between flank and line in volunteer regiments. Two companies out of ten were specifically organized as light and given a choice between rifles and muskets. The flank rifle companies which resulted were often detached from their regiments and used together for ‘special sharpshooting assignments. This was the case in the fighting on the mountains to the left of the American position at Buena Vista. Throughout this period there was a growing emphasis on the use of segments within a company. This emphasis resulted from the increase in the power of firearms which followed adoption of the Minie principle and the extensive experiments under way on repeating and breech-loading rifles. In order to offset the mounting vitality of firepower, professional soldiers began to stress dispersion in the official drill manuals. Dispersion, of course, strained the ability of officers to control large bodies of men, and consequently highlighted the need to organize smaller elements within units. Applied to a company, this meant an increased use of platoons (half companies) , sections (half platoons) , and the beginning of the fighting squad. The earliest suggestion of the squad was a file of two men, the two being taught to stick together during a fight. Later, for purposes of training, squads gradually changed from being irregular knots of men, in the drill manual of 1815, to being specified fractions of a company in 1841. The latter were to be quartered and exercised together. There was no expansion of their use in combat until 1855 when the new manual prescribed «Comrades in Battle» (two files, totaling four men) who were to work together in battle. There is another point about this period which deserves emphasis: the frequency with which the other two combat arms served as infantry. In the Florida War, artillery fought on foot and dragoons did likewise more often than not. During the Mexican War, the bulk of the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen fought on foot and only ten artillery companies had cannon, while the other thirty-eight served as infantry. They carried musketoons instead of muskets, and swords instead of bayonets; but they were trained for infantry service, and made an impressive record fighting as such. Under the provisions of the Constitution, the United States received complete control of the Regular Army-the descendant of the Continental Army-but not of the militia. Most of the power over the latter remained with the states, and the extent to which the Federal government could use state militias became a matter of endless controversy. Worse by far, from the standpoint of efficiency, was the fact that militiamen could only be held to serve for three months and that they were not liable to do duty very far from home. What is more, militia training differed widely from state to state, so that it was hard to fuse units from the several states into one army. When obliged to wage war as a nation, the United States was caught between the fear of a standing army and the inadequacies of a militia controlled by the several states. Some sort of compromise was necessary, and that proved to be an old type, volunteer soldiers organized into provisional wartime regiments. There were also peacetime volunteers- quite distinct from those raised for a war- at hand in the militia. In the large seaboard cities there were independent or chartered companies of citizen soldiers apart from the common or standing militia. They were composed of men who liked military exercise well enough to buy their own uniforms, drill regularly, and hold together in peace as well as war. These units usually received charters from the states, and they very soon constituted an elite corps. This corps became the parent of the National Guard of the twentieth century. The title «Volunteers» with a capital V was applied to them early in the nineteenth century, and it is used here to distinguish them from individuals or units who volunteered only for the duration of a given war. Volunteer infantrymen, when associated with the compulsory militia, took the posts of honor and their units were consequently often referred to as flank or light companies. Sometimes they had special weapons and actually trained as light infantry. When war came they sometimes volunteered to go as units or they became a relatively trained cadre around which some provisional regiment was built. By the 1850’s, the standing militia had deteriorated so far, and the Volunteers had become so stable, that many of the states abandoned the idea of compulsory service, and accepted the Volunteers as their constitutional militia. This done, they began to organize the scattered companies into battalions and regiments, a grouping that was well advanced in some states in the decade of the 1850’s. Volunteers were supposed to be organized and to train according to the discipline of the Regular infantry, but this was rarely the case. The Tactics of the Army were not widely enough disseminated, and were too voluminous for general use by the state militias anyway. As a result, Volunteers and militia used whatever manuals they could come by, which ranged from Steuben’s Regulations of 1779 to the latest translations of the French system. In the Mexican War, most volunteers reached the seat of war with little or no training; but some of them, once arrived, were associated with Regular brigades and quickly introduced to the Army drill. Like the training, the organization of citizen soldiers of all types was required by law to conform to the United States’ standards, but much latitude existed. The Maryland and District of Columbia Battalion of the Mexican War, for example, reached the combat area with only one field officer of the three required in the Regular service. Also, the size of regiments at that time varied from 923 on the under side of the Federal standard of 1,004 enlisted men, to 1,423, on the upper. In general, the Volunteers of the cities came closest to adhering to U.S. standards, both for training and for organization. The wide use of militiamen and volunteers carried with it an inevitable flabbiness in discipline. Citizens temporarily turned soldiers had no sense of unquestioning obedience to anyone and were usually not in service long enough to acquire more than a shade of it. Moreover, they almost always elected their own officers, which did not make for stern authority. Frequently, the lack of training and of discipline resulted in rout in battle, as happened on part of the field at Buena Vista. On the other hand, citizen soldiers often showed remarkable fighting ability, as was true, for example, of the Mississippi Rifles, commanded by Jefferson Davis, on another part of the same battlefield. In all instances, training and leadership were the ingredients that made the difference. Lack of training caused trouble less often in combat than in the intervals between, when life grew very dull. It must be remembered that a hitch in wartime was a lark for many a citizen, during which he left his inhibitions at home. Citizen soldiers made relations with the people of Mexico difficult because, as General Zachary Taylor said, «. . . it is impossible effectually to control these troops [for they lose] in bodies the restraining sense of individual responsibility.» Whatever the quality of U.S. Army foot troops, figures show quite well the change that was taking place in their source during wars. Nine out of ten infantrymen in the War of 1812 were militiamen. Only one out of ten foot soldiers was a militiaman in the Mexican War; three were Regulars, and six were war volunteers. This trend continued until the adoption of conscription in the twentieth century. The point to stress is that infantry doctrine and standards were set by the Regulars, but the mass of American infantrymen in wartime were citizen soldiers. The Civil War The infantry, both North and South, was far from ready for war in 1861. There were but ten Union foot regiments, and they were largely in the West, scattered by companies over thousands of miles. Until assembled, which would take time, they could be counted on for very little. Many of the Regular officers, the core of any expansion, had served in the Mexican War fifteen years before, but few had commanded any sizable body of troops. Moreover, although a small number had kept abreast of world military developments after their services in Mexico, they were not in a position to dictate policy in Washington. To add to the problems of the infantry early in the war, virtually no preparations had been made, apparently because statesmen hoped until the last minute that conflict could be averted. They believed that military adjustments would damage the chances of peaceful compromise. Thus, when war began, the foundations of what was to become a huge infantry establishment had to be commenced hastily and without real planning. Since Congress was not in session, President Lincoln began the war buildup in May 1861 with a proclamation of doubtful constitutionality. On the strength of his executive authority, he summoned thirty-nine regiments of volunteer infantry and one of cavalry to serve for three years. His next step was to authorize an addition of eight infantry regiments to the Regular Army. Somehow a ninth got included. Thereafter, the nineteen regiments in being- the 1st through the 19th- were the whole of the Regular infantry during the war. So neglected a part of the whole establishment were these nineteen that they were never able to attain their full authorized strength. Prior to issuing his call, the President consulted the War Department as to the best. organization for the new Regular units. The Secretary of War, being overburdened, turned the matter over to Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and loaned him three officers as technical advisors. The result was a recommendation in favor of the French structure. This included regiments of three battalions instead of one. Two battalions were supposed to take the field, the third to maintain a regimental depot for collecting and training recruits. Battalions of 800 men in eight companies were adopted as the most efficient fighting units because they were thought to be small enough to maneuver and to be controlled by the voice of the commanding officer, yet large enough to withstand attack by cavalry. A battalion in the French system was the fighting unit, a regiment the unit of administration. The French felt that a regimental headquarters could administer more than one battalion, an arrangement which appealed to Americans because it eliminated some field officers and thus saved money. The new three-battalion organization, however, was not extended to the ten old regiments, which continued to comprise ten companies each, with regiment and battalion one and the same. The men in authority felt that there was no time to bother with reorganizing outfits already extant, when so many remained to be organized from scratch. Furthermore, the old, single-battalion regiment was hallowed by age and tradition. This meant that two different regimental organizations were tolerated in the Regular infantry, a dualism that might have caused much confusion had the Regular regiments loomed larger than they did in the whole infantry establishment. The number of men in all Regular companies was raised at once to the maximum authorized by law, that is, 84 enlisted men in the first ten regiments and 97 in the other nine. Even so, the regiments never reached full strength because they could not compete with the volunteers for enlistments. By December 1861, some 30,000 Regular infantrymen were authorized, but barely 11,000 enlisted, while during the same period 640,000 volunteers entered the service. The third battalions of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, and 19th Infantry were never organized, and not all the companies were raised for the third battalions of the other four new regiments. In fact, the 11th, 12th, and 13th only imperfectly organized their second battalions. Each battalion of the new regiments designated its companies by letters beginning with A, so that, if fully raised, there were three A companies, three B companies, and so on in each regiment. Since replacements came more slowly than losses to the Regular regiments, all of them grew smaller as the war continued. By July 1864, as an illustration, the 2d Infantry had shrunk to 7 officers and 38 enlisted men, who were, thereafter grouped into one company and assigned to guard duty. Moreover, by 1 November 1864 all the Regular outfits of the Army of the Potomac were so reduced that it was necessary to withdraw them from the field. Such shrinkage was, of course, not confined to the Regulars. The average strength of regimentsmost of which ought to have contained 1,046 officers and men-was as follows in the battles named: Shiloh (6-7 April 1862) 560 Fair Oaks (31 May-1 June 1862) 650 Chancellorsville (1-5 May 1863) 530 Gettysburg (1-3 July 1863) 375 Chickamauga (19-20 September 1863) 440 Wilderness (5-7 May 1864) 440 The comments so far have referred mainly to Regulars, but this should not obscure the fact that most infantrymen were volunteers. These volunteers were members of regiments raised and officered by the several states. Initially President Lincoln called for thirty-nine such outfits, but before the war was over more than 1,700 volunteer regiments served. This was not far from one hundred times as many as there were units of Regulars. The three-battalion organization was not extended to the volunteers because the states, which raised them, were thought to be too much accustomed to the old system to change. As a result, the volunteer units, like the first ten Regular regiments, contained ten companies in one battalion. These regiments were variously numbered and designated by the several states, but in practice came to be called merely the «8th Indiana» or the «45th New York.» Although patterned after the old regiments in overall organization, the state regiments borrowed their company structure from the new, that is, they had ninetyseven enlisted men, instead of eighty-four, plus one wagoner whom the Regulars did not have. As matters were arranged, therefore, there were three different regimental organizations in the infantry. The volunteer regiments aggregated 1,046 officers and men; the 1st through the 10th Infantry, 878; and the 11th through the 19th, 2,367. Actually the battalions of the latter ought to be .compared with the old regiments, since they were designed to act independently and approximated the size of the others. They contained a few more than 800 enlisted men. Even though most of the volunteer infantrymen were raised and officered by the states, a few hundred units were not. Several types of volunteers were more directly linked to the United States than to any state, the earliest of these being two regiments of U.S. Sharpshooters (1st and 2d) organized in 1861. These two contained companies from several states, raised by the states. Their origin in more than one state was an uncommon attribute, but their real distinguishing feature was the manner in which they were officered. While the states appointed the company and field officers in ordinary volunteer units, the Federal government appointed them in the Sharpshooters and similar outfits. The next type appeared when large-scale acceptance of Negro troops began in 1863. A number of battalions had started as state units, but with the exception of two Massachusetts regiments, all Negro outfits were finally mustered directly into Federal service, and were organized and officered under the authority of the United States and not of any particular state. Known at first as the Corps d’Afrique and by other names, these units came to be called U.S. Colored Troops by the spring of 1864. Indian regiments (1st-4th Indian Home Guards) were handled in the same way. In all, there were 138 regiments of Negro infantry and 4 of Indians. Except for these two races, diverse nationalities could and did intermingle in infantry units, although men of German, Irish, and Scandinavian extraction proudly associated together in exclusive regiments. Yet another type of Federal volunteer emerged because casualties had reached such proportions that provision for the incapacitated, and replacements for them, had become critical problems. To solve these problems, the Invalid Corps was established in April 1863 and classed as infantry. It was composed of men who in the line of duty had become physically unfit for combat. Those who could handle a gun and make light marches were put in the 1st Battalion and were used for guard duty. The worse crippled formed the 2d Battalion and were used as nurses and cooks around hospitals. Six companies from the 1st Battalion and four from the 2d made up a regiment in the Corps after September 1863. In all, 24 regiments and 188 separate companies of invalids did duty, thus releasing able-bodied soldiers for combat service. In March 1864-because the Corps’ abbreviation, «IC,» was confused with «InspectedCondemned»-the name was changed to Veteran Reserve Corps. Finally, in 1864 six infantry regiments of U.S. Volunteers (1st-6th) were recruited for service on the frontiers (not against the Confederacy) from Confederate prisoners of war. Then in 1865, nine infantry regiments of U.S. Veteran Volunteers (1st-9th) were raised directly by the United States. Although all types of United States volunteers made up only a small fraction of the foot troops who served for the Union, they merit attention because of the intimate relationship between them and the Federal government, and because of the lack of vital connection between them and any state. This relationship foreshadowed the National Army of the twentieth century. The Confederate Army arranged infantry units pretty much as the Union did, except that all regiments contained ten companies. Authorized company strength was 64 privates minimum and 125 maximum. Around 642 infantry regiments served at some time or another, along with 9 legions, 163 separate battalions, and 62 unattached companies. Many of the Confederate units were the forbears of Army National Guard elements existing today. In the heat of the conflict, no changes were made in regimental organization, despite the fact that it was soon recognized as unsuitable. Improved firearms forced regiments and their companies to disperse to such an extent that officers could not effectively exercise control over them. Once .a regiment deployed, it was too big for one man and his staff to control. This fact helped to cause a high casualty rate among general officers, since the only way they could influence an assault, or rally a broken line, was to place themselves where everyone in the command could see them. At such times the enemy’s sharpshooters saw them equally well. Years after the Civil War, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, who had commanded the Army of the Ohio under Sherman, said that the cumbersome regimental organization had only worked in the course of the war because the replacement system was faulty. What he meant was that the unwieldy regiments at the beginning of the conflict dwindled through casualties until they reached a size which a colonel and his staff could handle. The same attrition, of course, applied to the control of companies. Companies were also unwieldy yet were. not reorganized. On the contrary, the promise of wide use of platoons, sections, and squads- a promise that may be detected in the infantry manuals of the 1850’s- was not fulfilled during the war. As a result, notwithstanding the fact that the need was far greater, there were no more officers in an infantry company than there had been forty years before. The reason why types of organization were retained that had been designed for use under different conditions stemmed from the great haste with which the armies were assembled in 1861. There was no time to make a wide canvass of professional soldiers, and those consulted were deceived by their belief that the conditions of the wars of Napoleon had not been radically modified. Few foresaw, and perhaps could not have foreseen, the full impact of the Minie ball upon warfare. The keystone of the whole matter was the heightened firepower which the infantry had to face and which it could wield. The foot soldier’s rifle musket, although a muzzle-loader, was vastly more effective than the weapons infantrymen had handled before 1855. It was accurate from 200 to 400 yards, and capable of killing at 800 to 1,000. Nor was it the only improved weapon. Scattered among the soldiers were many types of breech-loading repeating rifles which did great execution. Except for being unwieldy, regiments and their components proved otherwise adaptable to wartime conditions. For example, heightened firepower more than ever before demanded skirmishers in front of the battle line. These the regimental organization was able to supply simply by assigning any of its companies to the duty. Likewise, regimental organization lent itself well to the attack formation which became characteristic of the Civil War. This was a succession of lines. Each line was composed of two ranks with a prescribed distance of thirty-two inches between them. Of course, the lines varied greatly in length and in the distance at which they followed each other. Some were as long as a whole brigade lined up in two ranks, others only as long as a company. If there was a usual length, it was that of a brigade, since attacks by divisions in column of brigades were most frequent. In any case, regiments as organized were easily utilized in that type of attack formation, as they were in others. New means began to work during the Civil War to knit armies together and to speed their movements. For the first time, railroads were used extensively to move infantrymen to and from battle areas. This employment gave the foot soldier greater speed than he had in the past. In the field of communications, signal flags were first used. These enabled the parts of a force to keep contact with each other and to pass on information about the enemy. Newer still was the use of electricity, in the form of the telegraph, to link the components of a large force and to connect field elements with the Commander in Chief at Washington. The new modes of communication did not much improve the connection between units of the same army on the battlefield, but their indirect influence on the use of infantry was very great. The Signal Corps was constituted during the conflict to handle the new media of communication. Its service was great, but its relation to the infantry was only a tiny fragment of what it was to become in the future. In conclusion it must be said that the Civil War occurred in one of those periods, common in history, when weapons outdistanced organization and tactics. It is true that deadly fire brought about modifications in the use of infantry, one of which was the use of a succession of lines in the assault, another the regular employment of temporary field works. But even after taking these into account, it .seems clear that the rifle musket was more modern than the organization of the infantry and the resultant formations used in the assault. Otherwise stated, organization and tactics were basically those of the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the weapons were fifty years more modern. This discrepancy between weapons and minor tactics accounts in part for the shocking destructiveness of the Civil War. A Diverse Half Century, 1866-1915 Four years of war, and the large army built up during them, conditioned the nation in 1866 to the biggest increase in the Regular infantry since the War of 1812. The result was a postwar military peace establishment of twenty-six more Regular regiments of foot soldiers than had served for the Union. The total was forty-five. All regiments were formed on the prewar pattern with ten companies, and with regiment and battalion one and the same. The new companies were strong in noncommissioned officers and specialists, having a total of nineteen, and privates totaled between fifty and one hundred at the discretion of the President. The expansion of the infantry worked out as follows. The 1st through 10th Infantry retained their numbers. The first battalions of the 11th through the 19th expanded into regiments of the same respective numbers, and the second battalions into the 20th through the 28th Infantry. The first ten regiments needed no expansion, but the converted first and second battalions, being composed of just eight companies, required two more companies apiece. The 29th through the 37th Infantry were supposed to come from the third battalions of the Civil War units, but, since these had never been raised for the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, and 19th r
Frequently Asked Questions About HOOK & LOOP Backed OD Green Expert Infantry Tab — US Army 11B — Ranger — Grunt in My Website
lalu.uz is the best online shopping platform where you can buy HOOK & LOOP Backed OD Green Expert Infantry Tab — US Army 11B — Ranger — Grunt from renowned brand(s). lalu.uz delivers the most unique and largest selection of products from across the world especially from the US, UK and India at best prices and the fastest delivery time.
What are the best-selling HOOK & LOOP Backed OD Green Expert Infantry Tab — US Army 11B — Ranger — Grunt on lalu.uz?
lalu.uz helps you to shop online and delivers Arcteryx to your doorstep. The best-selling Arcteryx on lalu.uz are: Arc’teryx Womens Size 14 Gamma Lightweight Pants Light Gray Hiking Belted Mens Vintage Y2k ARCTERYX Soft Shell Jacket Outdoor Black Size L Mens New Arcteryx Delta Jacket Size Small Color Black Arc’teryx Vertex Alpine Gtx Sneakers Womens Sz 6.5 Running Shoes Gore Tex NWOB Arc’teryx Gamma LT Jacket Grey Men’s S Small Arcteryx Covert Hoody Pullover Men’s Women’s Unisex Green Polartec Fleece NEW! ARCTERYX Men Kyanite Hoodie Fleece Jacket—(XL)—Full Zip Fleece—“YUKON GOLD” ARCTERYX Gamma Utility 5” Shorts Black Nylon Hiking Climbing Women’s Sz 8 Arc’teryx Palisade Pants Mens 32×32 Black Climbing Trekking Performance Belted Arcteryx Pants Mens Extra Large Black Beta LT Waterproof Rain Hike Work 34×31 USMC GEN 2 Marpat Tan Woodland ILBE Main Pack w Lid Belt COMPLETE Arcteryx Arcteryx Atom lt Mens Jacket 24k Gold Limited Edition size XL Arcteryx Phase AR Zip Neck Mens XL Long Sleeve Quarter Zip Black Arcteryx Blade 28 Backpack Laptop Bag Carry-On Blue Travel — SAMPLE NWOT READ NWT NIP Arc’teryx Leaf Foliage Green 20th Anniversary Trucker Cap Hat One Size Arc’teryx Pullover Mens Medium Orange Gray Qtr Zip Polartec Caliber Sweatshirt Arcteryx Cerium LT Hoody Mens Green Puffer Jacket Down Size M Arc’teryx Gamma MX Hoody in Size M Men’s — Color Black — New w/Tags attached Arcteryx Polo Mens Medium Captive Performance Short Sleeve Hiking Arcteryx Konseal FL 9.5 Mens Arc’teryx Captive Long Sleeve Polo Shirt Mens Large Gray Hidden Snap Button Arc’teryx Creston Hiking Pants Mens 30 Black Waistband Relaxed Fit Straight Leg Arcteryx Nylon Hiking Backpack Nozone Arc’teryx Men’s Levon Pants Black Size 36 x 32 Stretch Cotton Blend Pre-owned NWT $100 Arc’teryx Rho LT Bottoms for Men Size Medium Color Forge arcteryx jacket Men’s XL atom LT Arcteryx Gamma LT Softshell Jacket Outdoors Gorpcore Men’s Size: Large Gray Arc’teryx Fortrez Hoody Mens Large Excellent Condition Arc’teryx Authorized Dealer Sign Vintage Streetwear TNF Arcteryx Style Outwear Oakley Softshell Jacket Men’s Arc’teryx LEAF Cold WX RHO Pants Crocodile — L Large Arcteryx Light Jacket Navy XXL Arcteryx Mantis 2 Waistpack Black Tan Shoulder Bag Crossbody From Japan NEW Arc’teryx Gamma MX Hoody in Size XL Men’s Color Blackbird — New w/Tags attached USMC MARPAT ILBE Arcteryx GEN 1 Lid (2-sided Molle) Very Good condition Arc’teryx_Therme Parka Men Arc’Teryx one size balaclava POLARTEC brand new ARCTERYX balaklava Arc’teryx Norvan Insulated Pants — Women’s Size 4 Regular Black NWT Mens Arc’teryx Edziza Kyanite Polartec Fleece Jacket Sweater sz L Arcteryx Alpha LT Beta Group Weiteng Brown Men’s Jacket Arcteryx Womens S Kyanite Black Hoody Full Zip Fleece Jacket *LOGO EMBROIDERED* Arc’teryx Gamma SL Anorak Mens XL Color Black Arcteryx Alpha SV Jacket (24k Black) (Size L) Arc’teryx Covert Cardigan 1/4 Zip Mens XL Color Black Made In Canada Arcteryx outdoor streetwear shirt men’s size M Arcteryx Fleece 1/4 Snap Henley Athletic Top S/M Small/Medium Dark Pink Arc’teryx XFunctional SV Pants — Rawhide — Size 34×35 — NWOT Arc’teryx Incendo Pant, Color Forage, Size XL Regular, NWT, ArcTeryx Fleece Jacket Womens Full Zip Black Polartec Sweater Hike Size XS Arc’teryx Mens XL Blue Strato Fleece Jacket ARCTERYX Gamma AR Jacket Arc’teryx Cita SL Hoodie — Women’s Arc’teryx Hoodie Land Rover Logo Size L Arc’teryx Mens Size 38×32 A2B Commuter Pant Dark Gray Reflective Pockets Arc’teryx Cranbrook Hat Black Size L-XL Arc’teryx Women’s Mota Long Coat Puffer Zip Up Nylon Hooded Black M ARC’TERYX GOTHIC HOODY ITALIAN WOOL JACKET XL UNISEX NEW ! Dark Gray RARE ! Arc’teryx Covert 1/2 Zip Mens Fleece Arcteryx Jacket Sz M Grey 34438 24093 ARCTERYX women’s AERIOS FL GTX hiking running shoes SASKAJAM/AEROSCENE size 7 Arc’Teryx Vintage Rt35 Red Black/Red Hiking Pack Size Large Vintage Arcteryx Hyllus Softshell Fleece Lined Hooded Jacket Mens Large ARC’TERYX Epsilon LT Jacket Womens Black Corporate Logo Arcteryx Mid Layer Arc’teryx Delta AR Pullover Mens Small Color Green NWT Arcteryx Women’s Rho LT Crew Base Layer Black Size : M ARCTERYX INSULATED JACKET WOMENS SIZE XL 34438 Arcteryx Oriel Leggings Womens L Gray Stash Pocket Yoga Outdoor Arc’teryx Cerium LT Hoody in Size L Men’s Color Black — New w/Tags attached Arc’teryx Gamma MX Hoody in Size XXL Men’s — Color Black — New w/Tags attached Arc’teryx Jacket Men’s Large Green Full Zip Fleece Polyester Polartec NWT Arcteryx Sentinel LT Gore-tex Jacket women’s Ski Snow SZ：S Arc’teryx Polartec Sweat Pants Womens Sz XS Elastic Waist Arcteryx Vest Men XL Black Full Zip Nylon Poly Sleeveless Zipper Pockets Stretch mens arcteryx Shorts. Size 38 Arcteryx Polo Shirt Mens Size Large Black Golfing Golf Outdooors Button Arc’teryx Aerios 30 Backpack 30 Liter Capacity Women’s Excellent Condition Blue Arcteryx Atom AR Hoody — Excellent — Mens XL — Bordeaux — 2022/2023 Updates ARCTERYX CERIUM LT Jacket MENS SIZE LARGE PUFFER DOWN arcteryx fission sv jacket black Insulated Men’s Large Vintage Arcteryx Bib Gore-Tex Xcr Black Pants Snowboarding Bib Snow Size Small Arc’teryx Atom LT Jacket Mens Medium Color Gray Great Condition Arc’teryx Atom LT Hoody Men’s Full Zip Jacket Size XL Arc’teryx Women’s Large Arenite Hoody Green Full Zip Fleece Lined Arc’teryx Atom Vest Black Arc’teryx SS21 ‘Micon GORE-TEX’ Shell Jacket Orange (2021) mens arcteryx Fleece Quarter Zip Large Green ARC’TERYX men’s large grey baselayer tights snow thermals NWD Arcteryx Vintage Rare Arc’teryx Strato Polartec Fleece Jacket Brown Olive Green Sz Large Arcteryx T Shirt Extra Large Blue Orange Arc’Word Logo Stretch Short Sleeve Arcteryx Jacket Womens XL Green Covert Hoody Full Zip Trim Fit Performance Arc’teryx Covert Pullover Hoody Men’s Small Orca Gray ARC’TERYX WOMEN’S COVERT CARDIGAN Jacket Sz L …in great condition…no… Arc’teryx Gamma Rock Pants Men’s Medium Feldspar (Gray) UEC Hiking, Climbing Arcteryx Aerios FL GTX Shoes 11 Mens Maroon GoreTex Hiking Running Trail Outdoor NWT Arc’teryx Leaf Crocodile Assault Balaclava FR Gen2 sz L/XL Unopened Arcteryx Gore-Tex Pro mens Orange Hooded Jacket size Large Arc’teryx — H150 Riggers Belt 7188 Medium? Preowned Arcteryx Puffer Jacket Womens Extra Small Darrah Mid Thigh Length Pockets Black Arc’teryx Palisade Pants Men’s 38×32 Belted Hiking Cargo Blue Arc’teryx Procline Hybrid Hoody Jacket Men’s Sz Large Blue Full Zip Arc’teryx Men’s 32×31 Slim Gray Lightweight Stretch Hiking Outdoor Pants Zipper Mens Pullover Fleece Hoodie